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1.  Introduction 
  Countries, like people, interact with each other on a number of different dimensions.  
Some interactions are strictly economic; for instance, countries engage in international trade of 
goods, services, capital, and labor.  But many are not economic, at least not in any narrow sense.  
For instance, the United States seeks to promote human rights and democracy, deter nuclear 
proliferation, stop the spread of narcotics, and so forth.  Accordingly America, like other 
countries, participates in a number of international institutions to further its foreign policy 
objectives; it has joined security alliances like NATO, and international organizations such as the 
International Atomic Energy Agency.  In this paper, we concentrate on the interesting and under-
studied case of international environmental arrangements (IEAs).  We ask whether participation 
in such non-economic partnerships tends to enhance international economic relations.  The 
answer, in both theory and practice, is positive. 
  Memberships in IEAs yield costs and benefits.  A country can gain directly from such 
interactions; its air might be cleaner, or there might be more fish in the sea.  However, some 
gains can be indirect. For instance, countries with long horizons and low discount rates might be 
more willing both to protect the environment and to maintain a reputation as a good credit risk.  
If they can signal their discount rate through IEA activity, they indirectly gain from better credit.  
Alternatively, countries that are tightly tied into a web of international relationships may find 
that withdrawing from one domain (such as environmental cooperation), may adversely affect 
activities in an unrelated area (such as finance).  The fear of these spillovers may then encourage 
good behavior in the first area. 
Our theoretical analysis begins with an extension of the “reputation spillover” concept 
introduced by Cole and Kehoe (1997).  In our model, countries – or rather, their policymakers –   2
have differing discount rates.  More patient governments choose to join a greater number of 
environmental treaties; this sends a credible signal concerning a country’s debt capacity.  
Creditors respond by granting the country more trade credit.  The predictions of this model are 
multilateral, since membership in IEAs is easily-accessible common knowledge.  A country that 
joins more IEAs enhances its reputation with all nations. 
This multilateral model is an intuitive start.  Still, it misses the fact that membership in an 
IEA confers special advantages on its members; if Argentina defaults on its Brazilian debt, 
Brazil can retaliate through environmental policy.  We thus extend the model to accommodate 
bilateral spillovers.  We allow a creditor to respond to default by reducing the debtor’s gains 
from involvement in mutual IEAs.
1  This extended model demonstrates that cross-country 
economic interaction can be a function of solo and/or joint participation in environmental 
treaties.  Succinctly: the more international environmental commitments that countries make 
individually and in common, the easier is economic exchange between the countries. 
We then take these ideas to the data.  Using a gravity model to control for other 
phenomena, we find that participation in IEAs is indeed positively associated with the 
international exchange of assets.  This confirms the notion of positive spillovers between 
environmental cooperation and economic exchange.  Moreover, we find that multilateral IEA 
participation is not a sufficient statistic to explain bilateral economic exchange; joint IEA 
participation is also related to asset cross-holdings.  The data therefore support our extended 
model with both a multilateral reputation effect and some sort of bilateral punishment 
mechanism.   3
A brief survey of the literature section is provided in section 2, while our theoretical 
framework is developed in the following section.  The empirical work is presented in section 4.  
The paper ends with a brief conclusion. 
 
2.  Literature Survey 
  The concept of reputation spillovers arose as a response to the Bulow and Rogoff (1989b) 
challenge to the sovereign debt literature.  In their seminal paper, Bulow and Rogoff cast doubt 
on the possibility of sustainable sovereign lending based solely on the desire of borrowers to 
maintain their reputations.  They demonstrated that such relationships would not be sustainable, 
because a borrower would eventually prefer to default on its debt and “self-finance” its 
consumption-smoothing. 
  This challenge was addressed in a series of papers by Cole and Kehoe (1995, 1997, 
1998).  They show that the problem with reputation-based borrowing stems from the fact that a 
borrower able to replicate interactions with other creditors receives only transient benefits from 
such relationships.  At some point, the benefits of maintaining a reputation fall sufficiently that 
default and subsequent self-finance is the rational response.  However, Cole and Kehoe (1995) 
show that the desire to maintain other interactions with creditor nations may support debt, 
provided that these other relationships are not transient but enduring.   Cole and Kehoe (1998) 
demonstrate that the desire to maintain reputations in enduring relationships can support a debt 
relationship with transient benefits.  Cole and Kehoe (1997) show that the desire to maintain an 
enduring relationship can support a transient debt relationship in a simple trigger-strategy model, 
where a creditor responds to default by breaking off debtor-relationship with enduring benefits.
2  
We borrow this modeling this strategy below in our theoretical work.   4
  A different literature of relevance concerns the formation and characteristics of IEAs; 
references here include Barrett (1994), Carraro and Siniscalco (1998), and Finus et al (2005).  
Most of the literature is skeptical about the ability of voluntary self-enforcing IEAs to improve 
on non-cooperative outcomes.  The intuition is that the level of any attainable environmental 
objective – say, abatement of a certain pollutant – is limited in a heterogeneous group by the 
preferences of the nation least interested in the problem.  While there has been some discussion 
about encouraging greater participation in IEAs through cooperation in other dimensions such as 
R&D activity (e.g., Carrero and Siniscalco, 1997), the literature is discouraged by the fact that 
such agreements are not explicitly found in practice (Barrett, 2003). 
 
3.  Economic Interaction and Participation in IEAs 
  This section introduces a simple model of economic interaction and participation in IEAs.  
We first introduce a model where IEA activity signals a country’s type multilaterally, and then 
consider the implications of bilateral penalties for sovereign default. 
 
3A. Pure Reputation Model 
We begin with a reputation-based model, where a government’s choices concerning 
membership in IEAs send a credible signal concerning its type to creditors; this, in turn, 
influences the country’s borrowing constraint. 
We assume that each of  1 k +  countries are endowed with x units of a perishable good in 
each period,  0,1,..., t =∞ .  We model decisions in terms of a representative country i. Decisions 
are made by a national government that maximizes the discounted utility of a representative 








=∑  (1) 
where 
i β  represents the country’s discount rate, 0 1
i β < < .  We order the countries such that i 
is increasing in impatience, the key parameter of the model, i.e. 
1 ii β β
+ ≤ .  We assume that the 
discount rate is private information.  For notational simplicity, we drop the i superscript and 
analyze a representative country. 
There are J  categories of environmental issues, numbered 1,..., j J = .  Each category is 
covered by an IEA (which we refer to interchangeably as a “treaty”) that requires participants to 
contribute a fixed amount of their consumption good e in each period, including period 0, 
towards improving the environment.  IEA  j  then yields a benefit, j y , in each of the following 
periods  0 t > . We number the treaties such that  1 jj yy + ≥ and assume that  j y  is a continuous 
twice-differentiable function of  j  that satisfies  '0 , j y <  "0 j y > , and lim 0 j j y
→∞ = . 
Since effort levels are constant across treaties, while payoffs are decreasing in  j , 
participation by country i in treaty  j  implies participation by i in IEAs 0 through j-1.  We 
therefore concentrate on the government’s choice of  * j , the number of treaties to join. 
We assume that countries engage in economic interactions with the rest of the world.  But 
while environmental interactions are multilateral in our model (at least initially), economic 
interactions occur between pairs of countries.  We model the latter in terms of a representative 
bilateral partner country, k , and assume that there are K  such countries with whom each 
country engages in trade.  This trade is facilitated by a bilateral exchange of trade credit.
3  In 
particular, the gains from bilateral trade between countries i and k in period t satisfy 
() ,
kk k
tt t TT d η = , where  ' 0, T ≥   "0 T ≤  in both arguments and 
k
t η  is a vector of characteristics   6
of the two countries (we later associate this with arguments that enter the standard bilateral 
gravity equation).  The payment due in period t on trade credit extended in period  1 t −  from 
country i to country k is represented by 
k
t d , where  / 0
k
t Td ∂ ∂≥  below an upper limit TT ≤ .
4 
  The timing of the model is as follows: in period 0, the government chooses
* j , the 
number of IEAs to join.  It then chooses whether or not to comply with the terms of these 
treaties.  Next, the representative competitive creditor in country k  chooses its repayment  1
k d .  
Finally, country i consumes the unused portion of its endowment.  In subsequent periods, the 
government again decides whether to comply (or not) with the treaty.  In addition, it decides 
whether or not to service its debt 
k
t d , while country k  chooses how much credit to extend and 
thus  1
k
t d + .  The country then consumes, subject to any penalties for default or shirking on its 
environmental commitments. 
  To insure sub-game perfection, we solve the model backwards, beginning in a 
representative period  1 t ≥ .  Initially, we treat default and IEA penalties as separate; below, we 
also consider an extension which allows punishment through environmental treaties. 
 
3B: Solving the Model 
  We solve the model in inverse sequential order for: a) the default decision; b) the IEA 
compliance decision; and c) the choice of participation in IEAs. 
  Consumption by country i in period  0 t >  is equal to the country’s endowment, plus the 
net gains from international trade (the gains from trade minus debt service) and environmental 
improvement, minus any penalties incurred for debt default or shirking on IEA commitments.
5  
These are:   7
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where: %
j y  represents the net payoff from participation in treaty  j  (which equals  j y e −  under 
compliance, and  φ −  under non-compliance; the latter represents the penalty for reneging on an 
IEA), and   
k
t d  represents the debt service payment (which equals 
k
t d  under debt service, and 0 
under default).
6 
   We assume that when the representative country services its debts it continues to obtain 
funds from all k  countries in each period in the future.  Discounted utility under debt service 
then satisfies 
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  If the country chooses to default on its credit obligations to country k , we assume that it 
loses access to trade credit with that country in the future.  Assuming that it fulfills its 
environmental treaty obligations and debt obligations to other creditors, discounted utility 
subsequent to default on credit obligations to country k  satisfies 
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By (3) and (4), the representative country will choose to default unless  
  ( ) ,
kk k
tt t dT d βη ≤ . (5) 
By (5), the credit ceiling will be a function of the creditor’s perception of the discount 
rate of the host country government.  This raises the possibility that a country might join more 
than its optimal number of IEAs to misleadingly signal that it is more patient, and thus ease its 
credit ceiling.  To address this issue, we first consider the decision problem faced in a separating   8
equilibrium, where governments reveal their true types through their IEA participation decisions.  
We then derive the conditions necessary to rule out pooling in the appendix. 
  We next turn to the IEA compliance decision.  In any period  1 t ≥ , the country is a 
member of treaties 1 through  * j .  If its government chooses to comply with the terms of treaty 
* j , it is easy to demonstrate that it will also comply with all treaties  * j j ≤ .  Under compliance, 
and given debt service, the government’s discounted utility again satisfies (3).  Alternatively, 
given non-compliance, the country suffers a direct penalty of φ  in every future period.  
Discounted utility under violation of treaty  * j  then satisfies  
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  In the first period, the government chooses  * j , the number of IEAs to join. Consumption 
in period 0 is equal to the endowment minus the initial IEA effort. 
  0 * cx j e = −  (7) 
 
For any IEA j , the government has three choices: 1) it can choose not to join the treaty; 2) it 
can choose to join the treaty and comply with its terms, and 3) it can choose to join the treaty but 
to violate its terms.  However, since the payoff from joining and shirking on a marginal treaty is 
negative due to the cost of non-compliance, no country will choose the last option; a country can 
always do better by simply not signing the IEA.  The relevant choice is thus whether to join an 
IEA and comply with its terms, or never sign the treaty.  By (3), (6), and (7), it follows that the 
representative country will choose to join (and comply with) treaty  j  if and only if 
  ( ) j ey β φ ≤ + . (8) 
Equation (8) demonstrates that the treaty compliance decision is based upon the 
difference between the single-period gain from shirking on the treaty commitment, and the   9
discounted sum of future gains from remaining in the treaty and avoiding the shirking penalty.  
Compliance is more desirable the higher are φ ,  * j y , and β , and the lower is e.
7  
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It can be seen by inspection in (9) that Ω is increasing in β .  This leads to proposition 1: 
 
PROPOSITION 1: Under a separating equilibrium, 
k d  is increasing in  * j . 
 
The proof is in the appendix.   
Proposition 1 demonstrates that in a separating equilibrium, the number of IEAs in which 
a country participates is a credible signal concerning its discount rate.  Creditors respond to this 
signal by offering more credit to a country whose government joins more environmental treaties.  
Succinctly, the model implies that higher international environmental involvement is associated 
with more international exchange of credit. 
 
3C. Adding Punishment via International Environmental Arrangements 
The prediction of the analysis above is multilateral; when Ruritania signs its IEAs, all its 
potential trade partners see this signal.  We now add bilateral linkages across countries, 
consistent with the framework of Cole and Kehoe (1997).  We assume that if Ruritania defaults, 
its creditors punish it in the environmental sphere.  We then demonstrate that this possibility 
increases economic integration over and above the level sustained through multilateral IEA   10
membership.  In the next section, we take this prediction to the data to verify the empirical 
importance of reputation spillovers.
8 
Formally, we specify the bilateral punishment to debt default as reducing the net gains in 
each period from membership in IEAs in which both countries i and k  are members by some 
fractionγ , 01 γ <≤ , so that the gains from being in treaty  j  are equal to ( )() 1 j ye γ −− .  An 
intermediate value of γ  may reflect a loss in cooperation between the two nations, while  1 γ =  
would involve a “grim strategy,” where the creditor nation responds to a default by its debtor by 




k m  as the highest-numbered treaty which contains both countries i and k .  With 
the addition of the bilateral treaty-based default penalty, the value of discounted utility under 
default satisfies 
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where ϕ  is an indicator variable that takes value 1 if 
k zm ≤ , and value 0 otherwise. 
  By (3), (9), (10), and 0 Ω≥ , the credit constraint from country k  satisfies 
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  Comparing (11) and (5), it can be seen that the capacity to levy bilateral treaty penalties 
under default eases the credit ceiling faced by country k .  This leads to: 
   11
PROPOSITION 2: Under a separating equilibrium, and given the bilateral treaty-based default 
penalty γ , 
k
t d  is increasing in  * j  . Moreover, 
k
t d  is also increasing in 
k m .  
The proof is in the appendix.  
 
  Both our models predict that the international exchange of trade credit (and thus 
k
t d ) will 
be increasing in the number of IEAs, * j .  Proposition 2 shows that the inclusion of bilateral 
penalties adds the prediction that international economic exchange 
k
t d  is also increasing in the 
number of joint treaties, 
k m .  Below, we test for the presence of both effects. 
The addition of the bilateral default penalty potentially adds a distortion to the treaty-
joining decision, as it increases the rate at which the credit ceiling eases when joining an 
additional treaty holding all else equal.  This alters the condition for a separating equilibrium.  
We therefore also derive the augmented sufficient condition for a separating equilibrium in the 
presence of these bilateral penalties in the appendix. 
 
4.  Empirics 
  We think of the model above as illustrative rather than one to be taken literally.  We have 
made a host of assumptions to keep the model stripped down to its bare essentials.  For instance, 
the model assumes: no production, no uncertainty (and thus no renegotiation), much symmetry 
(and thus no net debtors or creditors), limited interactions between countries, and so forth.  We 
think the analysis points to two key predictions (each summarized in a proposition).  First, a 
country’s non-economic commitments (which we model as the number of IEAs in which a 
country participates) should have a positive effect on its ability to conduct international 
economic exchange (which we model as trade credit).  Second, bilateral non-economic   12
interactions may also matter; the level of multilateral IEA participation may not be a sufficient 
statistic for the level of environmental engagement.  The number of IEAs common to both 
countries is also relevant to their bilateral economic interactions if there are “bilateral penalties.”  
We now take these predictions to the data. 
 
4A. Specification 
  Our pure reputation model characterized by Proposition 1, predicts that the level of 
international asset cross-holdings between two nations will be increasing in the number of IEAs 
in which each of them participates, while the extended bilateral penalty model, characterized by 
Proposition 2, predicts that the number of IEAs in which they are joint members is also relevant.  
Our goal in this section is to check these predictions.  
  Our empirical specification of international cross-holdings of assets is a generalization of 
the standard bilateral “gravity” model, which has been widely employed to model international 
economic exchange:  
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where i denotes the host country,  j  denotes the source country, and the variables are defined as: 
•  ij A  denotes asset cross-holdings held in host country i and sourced from  j , measured in 
(millions of ) dollars, 
•  ij D  is the distance between i and  j , 
•  i Y  is real GDP of i,   13
•  i Pop  is population of i, 
•  ij RTA  is a binary variable which is unity if i and  j  belong to the same regional trade 
agreement and zero otherwise, 
 
•  ij CU  is a binary variable which is unity if i and  j  use the same currency at time t, 
•  ij Lang  is a binary variable which is unity if i and  j  have a common language, 
•  i Area  is the total area of i, 
•  ij Cont  is a binary variable which is unity if i and  j  share a land border, 
•  i Landl  is a binary variable which is unity if country i is land-locked,  
•  i Island  is a binary variable which is unity if country i is an island nation, 
•  ij Comcol  is a binary variable which is unity if i and  j  were ever colonies after 1945 with 
the same colonizer, 
 
•  i IEA  is the number of environmental treaties that i has ratified at t, 
•  ij IEA  is the number of environmental treaties that i and  j  have both ratified at t, 
•  β is a vector of nuisance coefficients, and 
•  εij represents the other influences on bilateral credit, assumed to be well behaved. 
 
The coefficients of interest to us are { } γ .  γ1 represents the effect on international 
economic exchange of host country i's participation in international environmental treaties; γ2 is 
the analogous effect of joint IEA participation by i and j. 
 
4B. Data 
Our regressand is asset cross-holdings.  We use the Coordinated Portfolio Investment 
Survey (CPIS) data set, available annually for 2001, 2002, and 2003 from the IMF.
10  This 
records cross-holdings of asset stocks between up to 68 source and 221 host “countries”   14
measured in millions of US$.  The countries in the data set are listed in appendix table A1.  Asset 
cross-holdings are a good measure of economic exchange, but not a perfect measure of trade 
credit.  Accordingly, and to check the sensitivity of our results, we also use trade flows as a 
regressand.  We do this by merging into the CPIS data set bilateral data on exports and imports, 
measured in American dollars taken from the IMF’s Direction of Trade data set.  To smooth the 
data out, we average our series across the years available, so that our data becomes a single 
bilateral cross-section. 
As control variables, we merge in data on population and real GDP data (in constant 
dollars) taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.  We exploit the CIA’s 
World Factbook extensively for data on other regressors.
11  From it we find series on: latitude 
and longitude, land area, landlocked and island status, physically contiguous neighbors, 
language, colonizers, and dates of independence.  We use these to create great-circle distance 
and other controls.  We obtain data from the World Trade Organization to create an indicator of 
regional trade agreements, including some 178 regional trade agreements.  Finally, we add the 
Glick and Rose (2002) currency union dummy variable. 
The coefficients of interest measure the effect of solo (multilateral) and joint (bilateral) 
participation in environmental treaties.  Our data set on environmental treaties is the 
Environmental Treaties and Resource Indicators (ENTRI) data set produced by Columbia 
University.
12  The ENTRI data set contains country-by-country indicators of participation in up 
to 464 treaties.  The treaties range from the “Act regarding Navigation and Economic Co-
operation between the States of the Niger Basin” through the “Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties.”  The data set includes the usual suspects, including, e.g.: CITES (the “Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora”); Biodiversity   15
(“Convention on Biological Diversity”); and the Kyoto Protocol (to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change). 
ENTRI provides data for individual countries on: 1) which agreements the country has 
signed (so that a country is a “signatory” to a treaty); 2) which agreements are in force (where 
the country is a “party” to an agreement); as well as 3) agreements denounced (so that the 
country is a “former party” to a treaty).  There are only a small number of the latter; almost one 
hundred countries have not denounced any agreements (the United States has denounced three 
agreements; and the United Kingdom has denounced the largest number of treaties, ten). 
For our multilateral regressor  i IEA  (as well as j IEA , which we use simply as a control 
symmetrically), we simply sum up the number of agreements either signed or in force, and 
subtract from this the number of denounced agreements.  For our bilateral regressor ( ij IEA ) we 
sum up the number of agreements that are either signed or in force by both countries and subtract 
from this the number of jointly denounced agreements.  Simply adding up the number of 
international environmental treaties is obviously a crude starting point, since treaties are not all 
of equal importance.  We consider a more careful weighting of participation in different treaties 
to be an interesting topic for future work.
13 
We do not think there is much cause for concern with simultaneity.  The key variables – 
individual and joint participation in environmental treaties by the source and host countries – are 
plausibly exogenous.  There is certainly little evidence from the literature that countries take into 
account their potential attractiveness as a potential recipient for capital flows when 
contemplating environmental negotiations.
14  Nevertheless, we estimate our equations with both 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Instrumental Variables (IV), using standard errors that are 
robust to heteroskedasticity.  We use IV mostly to take into account measurement error, since a   16
simple summation of the number of active environmental treaties in which a country is 
participating is a noisy indicator of its international environmental commitments.
15  However, it 
is possible that a latent country-specific characteristic both makes a country a good destination 
for capital flows and a committed environmentalist. 
We use two instrumental variables for the number of environmental agreements as our 
default (we also experiment with our choices to check the robustness of our results).  The first is 
the country’s “polity” score, taken from the Polity IV data set.
16  This is a score that measures the 
political nature of the country.  It is available for 161 countries annually through 2003; the score 
for an individual country during a given year ranges from -10 (a high autocracy such as Qatar or 
Saudi Arabia) through 10 (a high democracy such as Australia or Austria).  We think of this 
instrumental variable as desirable since more democratic political regimes are likely to have 
longer time horizons. 
Our second instrumental variable is more directly tied to environmental considerations.  
We use the “Environmental Sustainability Index” (ESI), described by its creators as “a measure 
of overall progress towards environmental sustainability”.
17  The ESI was developed by the Yale 
Center for Environmental Law and Policy and the Center for International Earth Science 
Information Network at Columbia University, for the World Economic Forum, and is available 
for up to 145 countries for 2001 and 2002.  In 2001, the three countries with the highest and 
lowest ESI scores were Finland, Norway and Canada, and Haiti, Saudi Arabia, and Burundi 
respectively.  The ESI can be decomposed into five “core components”; above and beyond the 
ESI itself, we use the three most plausible of its components as IVs for sensitivity analysis 
(“Environmental Systems,” “Environmental Stress,” and “Human Vulnerability” to the 
environment).
18   17
Descriptive statistics for the key variables are presented in Table A2.  Table A3 contains 
simple bivariate correlations between the key variables of interest.  The regressors of interest are 
all positively correlated with the regressands.  Further, both instrumental variables have positive 
simple correlations with the number of environmental treaties. 
 
4C. Results 
  Our benchmark OLS results are presented in Table 1.  The first column presents a 
specification in which only there are no environmental treaties entered at all.  The next two 
columns add: first, the number of treaties to which each of the host and source countries 
separately belong (multilateral measures); and second, the number of environmental treaties to 
which both countries belong (a bilateral measure).  The most important column is that on the 
right, which includes both the bilateral and multilateral measures of environmental treaties. 
  While the control variables are not of direct interest, it is reassuring to see that the default 
gravity model seems to work well.  Countries that are further apart have fewer asset cross-
holdings, while countries with greater economic mass (as measured by GDP) have more.  
Holding GDP constant, countries with larger population (i.e., lower GDP per capita) exchange 
fewer assets.  A number of sensible features seem to raise cross-holdings, including a common 
language, currency, land border, colonizer or regional trade agreement.  Some of the purely 
geographic features (the physical size of a country, whether it is landlocked, and whether it is an 
island nation) also matter.  The equation fits well, with an impressive R
2 of .61 on a purely cross-
sectional basis. 
  Is there space for environmental commitment to matter above and beyond these factors?  
Yes.  Both the multilateral and bilateral number of environmental commitments have a positive   18
effect on asset cross-holdings.  If one examines the column on the extreme right (which gives the 
weakest results since it examines multilateral and bilateral effects simultaneously), for each 
additional jointly signed environmental treaty, asset cross-holdings by .03%.  This effect is small 
but plausible, and statistically significant at any reasonable confidence level.  If a pair of 
countries were to move from the 25
th percentile (with 7 jointly signed environmental treaties) to 
the 75
th percentile (with 54 joint treaties) holding other factors constant, asset cross-holdings 
would be expected to rise by around 1.5%.  Similarly, the effect of a host country’s 
environmental commitment also has a small positive and statistically significant effect on asset 
holdings; a one standard deviation increase in the number of environmental treaties signed raises 
asset cross-holdings by around .65%. 
  We consider our OLS results to be basically supportive of the idea that non-economic 
partnerships play a small but positive role in supporting economic exchanges such as 
international cross-holdings of assets.  Moreover, as we find that both multilateral and joint IEA 
membership are significantly positive, the results appear to support some level of bilateral 
punishment as well. 
Nevertheless, since our measure of a country’s international environmental commitment 
is both measured with error and potentially simultaneously determined with asset flows, we want 
to take instrumental variable results seriously.  These are presented in Table 2, which is 
formatted similarly to Table 1.  Reassuringly, both coefficients of interest remain positive and 
statistically significant when estimated with IV.  Indeed, consistent with the notion of either 
attenuation or simultaneity bias, the coefficients are even larger.  The effect of joint 
environmental treaties has almost doubled while the effect of a host country’s environmental 
treaties has more than quintupled!
19  We tend to act conservatively in our interpretation and thus   19
try not to take these magnitudes too seriously, especially given that the precision of the estimates 
has deteriorated.
20  Still, it seems reasonable to conclude that our OLS results do not stem simply 
from a flawed estimation strategy. 
  We check the sensitivity of our results further in Table 3.  We pursue four types of 
robustness checks: 1) moving from time-averaged to annual data; 2) changing the instrumental 
variables; 3) using merchandise trade instead of asset cross-holdings as the dependent variable; 
and 4) taking into account regional effects. 
We are comfortable with our strategy of averaging our three years of data into a single 
cross-section.  The span of the data is short so that the observations are highly dependent, and 
some country-pairs are not available for every year.  Still, panel estimation is certainly feasible.  
Accordingly, we estimated our equation by pooling our annual cross-sections, including year 
effects.  The OLS and IV results are tabulated in the first two rows of Table 3.  They indicate that 
our key finding of positive and significant effects of the number of both multilateral and joint 
(bilateral) environmental treaties on asset cross-holdings is robust to using pooled annual instead 
of a single cross-section of data. 
The next few rows experiment with the exact choice of instrumental variables.  First, we 
substitute the three most plausible components of the ESI (“Environmental Systems,” 
“Environmental Stress,” and “Human Vulnerability” to the environment) for the portmanteau 
ESI measure itself.  This allows us to eliminate the two other potentially problematic ESI 
components (“Social and Institutional Capacity” and “Global Stewardship”).  Our two key 
coefficients of interest are still positive and significant when we follow this estimation strategy.  
The same is true when we replace the ESI as an IV with the number of environmental treaties 
listed in the CIA’s World Factbook.  Appendix C of the Factbook tabulates 27 “Selected   20
International Environmental Agreements”; we use these in place of the (over 450) agreements 
listed by ENTRI, excluding only four that deal with the Antarctic.
21  Again, our two key 
coefficients of interest remain positive and significant.  However, our results are eliminated 
when we use either polity or ESI alone for instrumental variables; our only significant finding is 
for the number of joint environmental treaties when we use polity as the sole IV. 
A different check is to use the bilateral trade in merchandise goods instead of asset cross-
holdings.  Bilateral trade may involve trust relationships analogous to the role of debt in our 
model above, and therefore be increasing in the level of reputation spillovers from IEA 
memberships.  Still, our model is primarily concerned with default and punishment, so there is 
no clear reason to expect positive results.  Our results demonstrate that while the bilateral term is 
insignificantly different from zero (so that the number of jointly-signed environmental treaties 
does not seem to matter), the more agreements a country signs, the higher its trade.  Loosely, the 
trade results support pure reputation spillovers, but fail to identify evidence for punishment 
effects at standard significance levels. 
  Out final checks have to do with regional effects.  We do this in two ways.  First, we add 
three regional dummies: one for observations where either country is African; another for 
observations where either country is either Latin American or Caribbean; and a third where 
either country is Asian.  We then exclude observations for each of these three regions, one by 
one.  The results are tabulated in the bottom four rows of Table 3.  They indicate that our 
bilateral result – the effect of jointly signed environmental treaties – on asset cross-holdings is 
sensitive to the inclusion of regional dummies, or the exclusion of regional observations.  While 
the effects remain consistently positive, they are not significantly different from zero at   21
traditional confidence levels.  On the other hand, the key multilateral effect remains positive and 
significant throughout. 
  We have also conducted a number of other sensitivity checks.  We looked for a non-
linear effect of environmental treaties in a number of different ways (adding quadratic terms, 
using non-parametric techniques …) but found no compelling evidence of any significant non-
linearity.  We also looked without much luck for separate effects of both “small” and “large” 
environmental treaties, defining small treaties as those with less than ten participating countries, 
and large ones as those with fifty or more countries. 
  We conclude from all this that there is indeed a link between environmental engagement 
– as proxied through environmental treaty obligations – and international exchanges of assets.  
Moreover, this link appears to reflect both overall and joint IEA participation, suggesting that 
both the pure reputation and bilateral punishment channels for reputation spillovers play a role in 
the determination of cross-holdings of assets.  Sensitivity analysis also confirmed a role for 
overall IEA participation in the determination of trade levels, although joint IEA participation 
did not enter measurably in this specification, casting some doubt on the presence of bilateral 
environmental punishments as a facilitator of overall trade levels. 
 
5.  Caveats, Summary and Conclusion 
In this paper, we first developed a theoretical model that suggests that countries more 
deeply enmeshed in international environmental arrangements should also find it easier to 
engage in the international exchange of goods and assets with the rest of the world.  We then 
showed that two countries with a joint interest in the environment should also find it easier to 
sustain large cross-holdings of assets, since each can punish the other in one domain for   22
transgressions in a different domain.  We then tested these ideas, using a recent cross-section of 
international asset holdings, and environmental commitments.  Our empirics verify the 
significance of both effects, especially the first; multilateral environmental engagement 
facilitates international economic exchange. 
Is there a cost to “going it alone”?  Is it costly for countries to ignore international 
environmental agreements?  Yes.  Countries have varying degrees of foreign engagement.  Some 
are deeply enmeshed in defense alliances, environmental treaties, and international 
organizations; others are not.  Above and beyond the direct consequences of such entanglements, 
we have found in this paper that countries with greater IEA participation also have higher trade 
in goods and assets.  Thus membership in international institutions brings indirect benefits; not 
joining such partnerships has costs.  If our assertions are correct, they have consequences for 
policy.  For example, the debate on American participation in the Kyoto Protocol was framed in 
terms of the costs and benefits to the United States of participation in that treaty.  We chose to 
examine international environmental arrangements as one example of non-economic interactions.  
However, there are a variety of other domains in which countries interact; security arrangements 
and international organizations come to mind immediately.  If participation in such organizations 
also conveys broader economic benefits, these externalities should not be ignored.   
  A number of questions remain:  First, does bad behavior in the economic sphere (e.g., 
debt default) actually lead to retaliation outside the economic domain?  More directly, what are 
the costs of violating IEAs?  Do countries that violate international partnerships pay a cost, either 
indirect or direct?  We leave such fascinating questions for future research.   23
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Observations  6432 6354 6432 6354 
R
2  .61 .63 .63 .63 
Root MSE  4.227 4.131 4.116 4.111 
Dependent variable: log asset cross-holdings.  Columns estimated separately. 
OLS with robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Data averaged over 2001-2003. 
Intercept included but not tabulated. 
Coefficients that are significantly different from zero at .05 (01) are marked with one (two) asterisk(s).   26



































































































































Observations  4430 4430 4430 
R
2  .40 .55 .50 
Root MSE  5.288 4.552 4.822 
Dependent variable: log asset cross-holdings.  Columns estimated separately. 
IV with robust standard errors in parentheses.  Polity and ESI (host&source/product/both) as IVs. 
Data averaged over 2001-2003. 
Intercept included but not tabulated. 
Coefficients that are significantly different from zero at .05 (01) are marked with one (two) asterisk(s).   27
Table 3: Sensitivity Analysis 
















IV, Polity and 3 ESI 









































Other controls included but not reported: Log Distance, Log Host Real GDP, Log Source Real GDP, Log Host 
Population, Log Source Population, Regional Trade Agreement, Currency Union, Common Language, Log Host 
Area, Log Source Area, Common Land Border, Host Landlocked, Source Landlocked, Host Island Nation, Source 
Island Nation, Common Colonizer, and intercept. 
Dependent variable: log asset cross-holdings.  Rows estimated separately.  Data averaged over 2001-2003 unless 
noted. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  Polity and ESI (host&source/product/both) are IVs. 
Coefficients that are significantly different from zero at .05 (01) are marked with one (two) asterisk(s).   28
Appendix. 
 
Proof of Proposition 1 
 
 By  definition,  * j  is the largest value of  j  for which  0 Ω ≥  in (9).  By (9), since  0 Ω ≥  
is required for an IEA to be joined voluntarily, and since  * j y  is decreasing in  * j , an increase in 
an increase in 
* j  requires an increase in the minimum value of β .  As more credit is desirable, 
competition among creditors will then imply that they set the debt ceiling such that (5) is binding 
for the minimum value of β  that satisfies  0 Ω ≥ .  Let 
k
t d  represent the credit constraint given 
that the representative country it joins  j  treaties.  
k










η ≤  (13) 
  An interior solution for 
k
t d  requires that  * '/ j Ty e ≤ , where  '/
k TT d ≡ ∂∂, which we 
adopt.  Totally differentiating 
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where ' / j y yj ≡∂ ∂ , and the denominator is positive when we have an interior solution.  This 
completes the proof. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2 
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where the denominator can again be signed as positive given an interior solution.     29
 Alternatively,  if  *
k mj < , by (11)  / *
k
t dd dj  is the same as in (14) and positive, since the 
bilateral penalty is unaffected by the increase in  * j  in this case. Finally, by (11)  /
kk
























Conditions for separating equilibrium 
 
We can rule out a pooling equilibrium if no individual country would choose to deviate 
from its separating equilibrium solution to mimic a more patient government. We first examine 
the case where there are no bilateral penalties.  Suppose that instead of joining  * j  treaties, an 
individual government chose to join  *1 j +  treaties.  Under a separating equilibrium, the country 
would receive a credit extension that exceeded its borrowing constraint and then default on all K  
countries.  By (3) and (8), its discounted utility would satisfy 
 

















=− + + + + + − ⎨ ⎬ ⎜⎟ − ⎝⎠ ⎩⎭ ∑∑  (17) 
 
so that the gain in utility from joining an additional treaty relative to playing the separating 
equilibrium strategy is equal to 
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⎡⎤ −= −+ + − ⎨⎬ ⎜⎟ ⎣⎦ − ⎝⎠ ⎩⎭ ∑ (18) 
 
  The first term is negative, reflecting the loss from entering into an excessive number of 
IEA treaties, while the second term is positive, reflecting the gains from easing country i’s credit 
constraint.   
 
  To evaluate the condition needed to rule out pooling, we also need to consider infra-
marginal choices of  j .  We first demonstrate that the utility from mimicking a more patient 
government by choosing to join more than the number of treaties that would be optimal under the 
separating equilibrium, $ * j j > , is decreasing in $ j .  By (18) 
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⎛⎞ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡⎤ −= − + +− ⎜⎟ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ − ⎝⎠ ∑  (19) 
 
Differentiating with respect to $ j  yields 
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  This condition will be satisfied if T  is sufficiently concave in 
k d .  A sufficient, but not 
necessary, condition is  
 






≥  (24) 
 
which we take as a parameter restriction. 
 
  Given the parameter restriction in (24), the gain from joining an additional treaty relative 
to any $ * j j >  is decreasing in $ j .  A separating equilibrium will then obtain if no country would 
choose to join  * 1 j +  treaties, i.e.  if the term in equation (18) is negative.   
 
The necessary and sufficient condition is 
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⎡ ⎤ +− ≤ − ⎜⎟ ⎣ ⎦ − ⎝⎠ ∑  (25)   31
  
which we adopt.  Satisfaction of conditions (23) and (25) then guarantee a separating 
equilibrium. 
 
  Finally, we examine the conditions for a separating equilibrium in the presence of 
bilateral default penalties.  The gain from joining an additional treaty relative to any $ * j j >  will 
be the same as in (19), with the exception that 
k
t d  will now also be a function of 
k m  if  *
k mj < .  
As before, this gain will be decreasing in $ j  if 
22 /0 Tj ∂ ∂≤.  However, the components of 
22 / Tj ∂∂  now incorporate the impact of bilateral penalties.   
 
To derive a sufficient, but not necessary, condition for a separating equilibrium, we 
evaluate the case where adding an additional treaty yields the largest impact possible.  This 
would is the case where joining an additional treaty increase 
ik m  for all k  creditor nations, i.e.  
where *
k j mkK =∀ ∈ .   /
k dj ∂∂  would then satisfy (15). 
 
  The second derivative now satisfies 
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T will then be concave in  j  if T  is sufficiently concave in 
k
t d . The necessary and 
sufficient condition is 
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  As before, then, we can rule out a pooling equilibrium if a government would not choose 
to join an additional treaty relative to its undistorted choice.  The formal condition is again that in 
(25), with 
k
t d  now corresponding to (11).  This condition is more restrictive because of 
increasing the number of joint treaties between countries i and k , raises the penalty for default 
on obligations to country k .  It therefore follows that satisfaction of conditions (25) and (27) 
with  
k
t d  corresponding to (11) are sufficient, but not necessary, to rule out pooling in the nested 
model, i.e.  with or without bilateral penalties.     32
 
 
Table A1: Countries in CPIS Data Set 
Afghanistan Albania  Algeria American  Samoa  Andorra 
Angola Anguilla  Antigua  and  Barbuda  Argentina*  Armenia 
Aruba* Australia*  Austria* Azerbaijan  Bahamas* 
Bahrain* Bangladesh  Barbados Belarus  Belgium* 
Belize Benin Bermuda  Bhutan  Bolivia 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  Botswana  Brazil  British Virgin Islands  Brunei Darussalam 
Bulgaria* Burkina  Faso  Burundi  Cambodia Cameroon 
Canada*  Cape Verde  Cayman Islands* Central  African  Rep.  Chad 
Chile*  China  Colombia*  Comoros  Congo (Zaire/Kinshasa)  
Congo (Brazzaville)   Cook Islands  Costa Rica*  Côte d'Ivoire  Croatia 
Cuba Cyprus*  Czech  Republic*  Denmark*  Djibouti 
Dominica  Dominican Republic  Ecuador  Egypt*  El Salvador 
Equatorial Guinea  Eritrea  Estonia* Ethiopia Falkland  Islands 
Faeroe Islands  Fiji  Finland*  France*  French Guiana 
French Polynesia  Gabon  Gambia  Georgia  Germany* 
Ghana Gibraltar  Greece*  Greenland  Grenada 
Guadeloupe  Guam  Guatemala Guernsey* Guinea 
Guinea-Bissau Guyana  Haiti  Honduras  Hong  Kong* 
Hungary* Iceland*  India  Indonesia*  Iran 
Iraq  Ireland*  Isle of Man*  Israel*  Italy* 
Jamaica Japan*  Jersey*  Jordan  Kazakhstan* 
Kenya  Kiribati Korea* Kuwait Kyrgyz  Republic 
Laos Latvia  Lebanon*  Lesotho  Liberia 
Libya Liechtenstein  Lithuania  Luxembourg*  Macau* 
Macedonia Madagascar  Malawi Malaysia*  Maldives 
Mali Malta*  Marshall  Islands  Martinique  Mauritania 
Mauritius* Mexico  Micronesia Moldova  Monaco 
Mongolia Montserrat  Morocco  Mozambique  Myanmar 
Namibia Nauru  Nepal  Netherlands*  Netherlands  Antilles* 
New Caledonia  New Zealand*  Nicaragua Niger  Nigeria 
North Korea  Norway*  Oman  Pakistan*  Palau 
Panama*  Papua New Guinea  Paraguay Peru  Philippines* 
Poland* Portugal*  Puerto  Rico  Qatar  Réunion 
Romania* Russian  Federation*  Rwanda  St.  Helena  St.  Kitts and Nevis 
St.  Lucia  St.  Pierre & Miquelon  St.  Vincent & Gren.  Samoa  San Marino 
São Tomé and Príncipe  Saudi Arabia  Senegal Serbia  and  Montenegro  Seychelles 
Sierra Leone  Singapore*  Slovak Republic* Slovenia  Solomon  Islands 
Somalia  South Africa*  Spain*  Sri Lanka  Sudan 
Suriname Swaziland  Sweden* Switzerland*  Syrian Arab Republic 
Taiwan Tajikistan  Tanzania  Thailand*  Togo 
Tonga  Trinidad and Tobago  Tunisia  Turkey*  Turks & Caicos Islands 
Turkmenistan  Tuvalu  Uganda  Ukraine*  United Arab Emirates 
United Kingdom*  United States*  Uruguay* Uzbekistan  Vanuatu* 
Venezuela* Vietnam  Virgin Islands  Yemen  Zambia 
Zimbabwe       
Note: Source countries also marked with an asterisk.   33
Table A2: Descriptive Statistics 
  Obs. Mean  Std.    Dev.  Min  Max 
Log Assets  9,396 -3.33  6.62  -9.21 13.20 
Log Trade  11,031 2.41  3.53  -6.40 12.85 
# Environmental Treaties, Joint  14,960 38.47  32.53  0  232 
# Environmental Treaties, Host  13,403 78.08  50.09  1  278 
# Environmental Treaties, Source  13,420 125.4  60.75  1  278 
Log Distance   14,960  7.91 .75 3.18  9.27 
Log Host Real GDP  10,242 17.37  2.09  12.85  23.03 
Log Source Real GDP  11,710 18.90  1.72  13.27  23.03 
Log Host Population  11,862  8.56 2.08 3.00  14.06 
Log Source Population  12,200  9.19 1.97 4.15  12.57 
Regional Trade Agreement  14,960 .106  .31  0  1 
Currency Union  14,960 .014  .12  0  1 
Common Language  14,960 .19  .39  0  1 
Log Host Area  14,960 10.63  3.20  .69  16.65 
Log Source Area  14,960 11.11  3.20  3.04  16.65 
Common Land Border  14,960 .01  .12  0  1 
Host Landlocked  14,960 .17  .37  0  1 
Source Landlocked  14,960 .08  .28  0  1 
Host Island Nation  14,960 .21  .41  0  1 
Source Island Nation  14,960 .20  .40  0  1 
Common Colonizer  14,960 .07  .26  0  1 
Host Polity  10,487 3.21  6.64  -10  10 
Source Polity  11,660 7.68  4.42  -7  10 
Product, Host and Source Polity  8,162 24.47  60.52  -100  100 
Host ESI  9,605 49.45  9.02  23.9  73.9 
Source ESI  11,220 54.36  9.08  35  73.9 
Product, Host and Source ESI  7,191 2687.2  666.7  836.5 5394.7 
Data averaged over 2001-03. 
 
 
Table A3: Bivariate Correlations 





Env.  Trts 
# Host 
Env.  Tr. 
Log Trade  .71     
# Environmental Treaties, Joint  .70 .65     
# Environmental Treaties, Host  .63 .57  .78   
Host Polity  .48  .31 .49 .56 
Product, Host and Source Polity  .47  .30 .52 .49 
Host ESI  .33  .17 .36 .40 
Product, Host and Source ESI  .23  .01 .30 .29 
4,636 observations 
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Table A4: First Stage 

































2  .70 .65 
Other controls included but not reported: Log Distance, Log Host Real GDP, Log Source Real GDP, Log Host 
Population, Log Source Population, Regional Trade Agreement, Currency Union, Common Language, Log Host 
Area, Log Source Area, Common Land Border, Host Landlocked, Source Landlocked, Host Island Nation, Source 
Island Nation, Common Colonizer, and intercept. 
Columns estimated separately.  Standard errors in parentheses.  Data averaged over 2001-2003. 
Coefficients that are significantly different from zero at .05 (01) are marked with one (two) asterisk(s). 
 
 
Table A5: Determination Equation 
 Log  Log  Level 






















































2  .72 .70 .66 
RMSE  .271 .281 30.9 
Cross-section of 134 countries.  Regressand is number of environmental treaties a country has signed or ratified, 
minus those it has denounced.  “Log” columns take natural logarithms of regressand, income, population, and area. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  Columns estimated separately. 
Coefficients that are significantly different from zero at .05 (01) are marked with one (two) asterisk(s).   35
Endnotes 
                                                 
1 A cautionary note: there is little evidence of punishment of any form for transgressions in international economic 
exchange. However, as our model is deterministic, punishment is not observed along equilibrium paths. 
2 There have been other approaches to the challenge raised by Bulow and Rogoff (1989b).  Some have concentrated 
on the ability of another creditor to step in and allow for self-finance subsequent to default.  Eaton (1996) and 
Kletzer and Wright (2000) examine the implications of limiting the commitment capabilities of creditors in 
sovereign debt models to the level of their debtors.  Wright (2002) concentrates on the possibility that the alternative 
Swiss bankers may not be available for the pursuit of self-finance if creditors find it optimal to collude against a 
borrower with a history of default.  Krueger and Uhlig (2003) examine relationships where creditors have the ability 
to commit to making contingent payments, but there is a positive cost of initiating a credit relationship that limits a 
borrower’s ability to switch creditors subsequent to a default.  All of these generalizations concerning alternative 
financing opportunities defang the Bulow-Rogoff problem sufficiently to allow sovereign borrowing to reemerge. 
3 Trade credit is a simple device to ensure that capital flows both ways between countries without introducing the 
complications of risk-sharing. 
4 As the benefits from trade are enduring and the endowment is constant by assumption, the Bulow-Rogoff critique 
concerning the unsustainability of reputation-based borrowing does not apply here. 
5 There are also flows from lending activity by private creditors in country i  with the rest of the world. However, as 
creditors are risk neutral by assumption, the expected (and realized in this deterministic model) sum of these flows 
reflecting activity by private agents in country i  are zero. In particular, we maintain the assumption that the validity 
of private claims by agents in country i  are independent of that country’s default decision on its sovereign debt. 
6 For simplicity, we assume that the penalty for shirking on environmental obligations is homogeneous across 
treaties.  This drives none of our results, but allows treaties to differ only in their payoffs.   
7 A more realistic approach to environmental policy would make the benefits – yj in our model – rise over time, so 
that pollution abatement is viewed as an investment project where the costs are borne immediately for later benefits.  
Adding such time-variation in the net benefits of IEAs would only strengthen our results. 
8 It should be emphasized that denying participation in other relationships as a result of default does not require 
remaining within the framework of “reputation-based” models of sovereign lending.  One could interpret spillover 
enforcements as sanctions, and remain within a large sovereign debt literature associated with sanctions.  We focus 
below on the effects of reputation spillovers in determining international trade flows.  Interruptions of trade can 
quite reasonably be characterized as default penalties; Bulow and Rogoff (1989a), Rose and Spiegel (2004). 
9 The capacity to punish partners may differ across countries.  For example, a large country may be able to influence 
treaty policies more than a small one.  However, as influence may differ in a number of unknown dimensions, we do 
not attempt to introduce any explicit heterogeneity in punishment technology across countries, although we do 
condition for other attribute differences, such as country size, in our empirical specification. 
10 http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/pi/cpis.htm.  The CPIS data set has its foibles; for instance, a number of entries 




13 In the model above, our ability to monotonically order the IEAs in terms of desirability implied that if j*≥ji* an 
increase in j* would have no impact on m
i.  In the data, however, countries are likely to have heterogeneous 
preferences across treaties for a variety of reasons, allowing j*  and m
i  to vary independently.  We therefore treat 
these variables as independent in our empirical analysis. 
14 This is in contrast to participation in security alliances and/or international organizations, which are sometimes 
linked to international trade of goods, services, and assets.  Indeed, this is one of the reasons for our focus on IEAs 
as opposed to some other form of non-economic international partnership. 
15 Measurement error likely exists in a number of dimensions: Other international organizations, such as the 
European community, also contain environmental accords. Alternatively, the United States is not a member of the 
Niger River Basin Accord primarily due to its location, and not due to the policy preferences of its government. 
16 http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/ 
17 http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/es/esi/ 
18 This is potentially important since one of the (67) inputs into the (“Global Stewardship” component of the) ESI is 
the number of international environmental organizations in which a country participates.  Environmental Systems 
measures things like air and water quality through SO2 and NO2 air and phosphorus water concentrations.    36
                                                                                                                                                             
Environmental Stress measures things like pollution through fertilizer and pesticide use as well as coal and vehicular 
usage.  Human Vulnerability use things like death rates from respiratory and intestinal infectious disease. 
19 The effect of a source country’s environmental commitment is now positive and significant; we have no 
explanation for this result. 
20 The relevant part of the first stage of our IV estimates is presented in Table A4 of the appendix.  It shows that the 
two instrumental variables (polity and ESI) are positively linked to the number of environmental treaties. 
21 http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/appendix/appendix-c.html 